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Invited Paper:
THE INSIGNIFICANCE
OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE
TESTING
DOUGLASH. JOHNSON,1U.S. GeologicalSurvey, BiologicalResources Division,NorthernPrairieWildlifeResearch Center,
Jamestown,ND 58401, USA
Abstract: Despite their wide use in scientific journals such as The Journal of Wildlife Management, statistical
hypothesis tests add very little value to the products of research. Indeed, they frequently confuse the interprettation of data. This paper describes how statistical hypothesis tests are often viewed, and then contrasts
that interpretation with the correct one. I discuss the arbitrariness of P-values, conclusions that the null hypothesis is true, power analysis, and distinctions between statistical and biological significance. Statistical hypothesis testing, in which the null hypothesis about the properties of a population is almost always known a
priori to be false, is contrasted with scientific hypothesis testing, which examines a credible null hypothesis
about phenomena in nature. More meaningful alternatives are briefly outlined, including estimation and confidence intervals for determining the importance of factors, decision theory for guiding actions in the face of
uncertainty, and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing and other statistical practices.

JOURNALOF WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT
63(3):763-772
Key words: Bayesian approaches, confidence interval, null hypothesis, P-value, power analysis, scientific hypothesis test, statistical hypothesis test.

Statistical testing of hypotheses in the wildlife
field has increased dramatically in recent years.
Even more recent is an emphasis on power
analysis associated with hypothesis testing (The
Wildlife Society 1995). While this trend was occurring, statistical hypothesis testing was being
deemphasized in some other disciplines. As an
example, the American Psychological Association seriously debated a ban on presenting results of such tests in the Association's scientific
journals. That proposal was rejected, not because it lacked merit, but due to its appearance
of censorship (Meehl 1997).
The issue was highlighted at the 1998 annual
conference of The Wildlife Society, in Buffalo,
New York, where the Biometrics Working
Group sponsored a half-day symposium on
Evaluating the Role of Hypothesis TestingPower Analysis in Wildlife Science. Speakers at
that session who addressed statistical hypothesis
testing were virtually unanimous in their opinion that the tool was overused, misused, and
often inappropriate.
My objectives are to briefly describe statistical hypothesis testing, discuss common but incorrect interpretations of resulting P-values,
mention some shortcomings of hypothesis testing, indicate why hypothesis testing is conducted, and outline some alternatives.
1 E-mail:

douglas-h_johnson@nbs.gov

WHAT IS STATISTICALHYPOTHESIS
TESTING?
Four basic steps constitute statistical hypothesis testing. First, one develops a null hypothesis
about some phenomenon or parameter. This null
hypothesis is generally the opposite of the research hypothesis, which is what the investigator
truly believes and wants to demonstrate. Research hypotheses may be generated either inductively, from a study of observations already
made, or deductively, deriving from theory. Next,
data are collected that bear on the issue, typically
by an experiment or by sampling. (Null hypotheses often are developed after the data are in
hand and have been rummaged through, but
that's another topic.) A statistical test of the null
hypothesis then is conducted, which generates a
P-value. Finally, the question of what that value
means relative to the null hypothesis is considered. Several interpretations of P often are made.
Sometimes P is viewed as the probability that
the results obtained were due to chance. Small
values are taken to indicate that the results were
not just a happenstance. A large value of P, say
for a test that 1i = 0, would suggest that the
mean x actually recorded was due to chance,
and [p could be assumed to be zero (Schmidt
and Hunter 1997).
Other times, 1-P is considered the reliability
of the result; that is, the probability of getting-
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the same result if the experiment were repeated. Significant differences are often termed "reliable" under this interpretation.
Alternatively, P can be treated as the probability that the null hypothesis is true. This interpretation is the most direct one, as it addresses head-on the question that interests the
investigator.
These 3 interpretations are what Carver
(1978) termed fantasies about statistical significance. None of them is true, although they are
treated as if they were true in some statistical
textbooks and applications papers. Small values
of P are taken to represent strong evidence that
the null hypothesis is false, but workers demonstrated long ago (see references in Berger
and Sellke 1987) that such is not the case. In
fact, Berger and Sellke (1987) gave an example
for which a P-value of 0.05 was attained with a
sample of n = 50, but the probability that the
null hypothesis was true was 0.52. Further, the
disparity between P and Pr[H0 I data], the probability of the null hypothesis given the observed
data, increases as samples become larger.
In reality, P is the Pr[observed or more extreme data I Ho], the probability of the observed
data or data more extreme, given that the null
hypothesis is true, the assumed model is correct, and the sampling was done randomly. Let
us consider the first 2 assumptions.

What are More ExtremeData?
Suppose you have a sample consisting of 10
males and 3 females. For a null hypothesis of a
balanced sex ratio, what samples would be more
extreme? The answer to that question depends
on the sampling plan used to collect the data
(i.e., what stopping rule was used). The most
obvious answer is based on the assumption that
a total of 13 individuals was sampled. In that
case, outcomes more extreme than 10 males
and 3 females would be 11 males and 2 females,
12 males and 1 female, and 13 males and no
females.
However, the investigator might have decided
to stop sampling as soon as he encountered 10
males. Were that the situation, the possible outcomes more extreme against the null hypothesis
would be 10 males and 2 females, 10 males and
1 female, and 10 males and no females. Conversely, the investigator might have collected data until
3 females were encountered. The number of
more extreme outcomes then are infinite: they include 11 males and 3 females, 12 males and 3
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females, 13 males and 3 females, etc. Alternatively, the investigator might have collected data until
the difference between the numbers of males and
females was 7, or until the difference was significant at some level. Each set of more extreme
outcomes has its own probability, which, along
with the probability of the result actually obtained, constitutes P
The point is that determining which outcomes
of an experiment or survey are more extreme
than the observed one, so a P-value can be calculated, requires knowledge of the intentions of
the investigator (Berger and Berry 1988). Hence,
P, the outcome of a statistical hypothesis test, depends on results that were not obtained; that is,
something that did not happen, and what the
intentions of the investigator were.

Are Null Hypotheses ReallyTrue?
P is calculated under the assumption that the
null hypothesis is true. Most null hypotheses
tested, however, state that some parameter
equals zero, or that some set of parameters are
all equal. These hypotheses, called point null
hypotheses, are almost invariably known to be
false before any data are collected (Berkson
1938, Savage 1957, Johnson 1995). If such hypotheses are not rejected, it is usually because
the sample size is too small (Nunnally 1960).
To see if the null hypotheses being tested in
The Journal of Wildlife Management can validly
be considered to be true, I arbitrarily selected
2 issues: an issue from the 1996 volume, the
other from 1998. I scanned the results section
of each paper, looking for P-values. For each Pvalue I found, I looked back to see what hypothesis was being tested. I made a very biased
selection of some conclusions reached by rejecting null hypotheses; these include: (1) the
occurrence of sheep remains in coyote (Canis
latrans) scats differed among seasons (P = 0.03,
n = 467), (2) duckling body mass differed
among years (P < 0.0001), and (3) the density
of large trees was greater in unlogged forest
stands than in logged stands (P = 0.02). (The
last is my personal favorite.) Certainly we knew
before any data were collected that the null hypotheses being tested were false. Sheep remains
certainly must have varied among seasons, if
only between 61.1% in 1 season and 61.2% in
another. The only question was whether or not
the sample size was sufficient to detect the difference. Likewise, we know before data are collected that there are real differences in the oth-
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er examples, which are what Abelson (1997) referred to as "gratuitous" significance testingtesting what is already known.
Three comments in favor of the point null
hypothesis, such as pL = L0o.First, while such
hypotheses are virtually always false for sampling studies, they may be reasonable for experimental studies in which subjects are randomly assigned to treatment groups (Mulaik et
al. 1997). Second, testing a point null hypothesis
in fact does provide a reasonable approximation
to a more appropriate question: is ,L nearly
equal to X0o(Berger and Delampady 1987, Berger and Sellke 1987), if the sample size is modest (Rindskopf 1997). Large sample sizes will
result in small P-values even if Ji is nearly equal
to pL0.Third, testing the point null hypothesis is
mathematically much easier than testing composite null hypotheses, which involve noncentrality parameters (Steiger and Fouladi 1997).
The bottom line on P-values is that they relate to data that were not observed under a
model that is known to be false. How meaningful can they be? But they are objective, at least;
or are they?

STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE
TESTING Johnson

765

use of a standard cutoff value, usually denoted
a. P-values less than or equal to a are deemed
significant; those greater than a are nonsignificant. Use of a was advocated by Jerzy Neyman
and Egon Pearson, whereas R. A. Fisher recommended presentation of observed P-values
instead (Huberty 1993). Use of a fixed a level,
say a = 0.05, promotes the seemingly nonsensical distinction between a significant finding if
P = 0.049, and a nonsignificant finding if P =
0.051. Such minor differences are illusory anyway, as they derive from tests whose assumptions often are only approximately met (Preece
1990). Fisher objected to the Neyman-Pearson
procedure because of its mechanical, automated nature (Mulaik et al. 1997).

Proving the Null Hypothesis

Discourses on hypothesis testing emphasize
that null hypotheses cannot be proved, they can
only be disproved (rejected). Failing to reject a
null hypothesis does not mean that it is true.
Especially with small samples, one must be
careful not to accept the null hypothesis. Consider a test of the null hypothesis that a mean
pLequals p.0.The situations illustrated in Figure
1 both reflect a failure to reject that hypothesis.
P is Arbitrary
1A suggests the null hypothesis may well
Figure
If the null hypothesis truly is false (as most of
be false, but the sample was too small to indithose tested really are), then P can be made as
cate significance; there is a lack of power. Consmall as one wishes, by getting a large enough
versely,
Figure lB shows that the data truly
sample. P is a function of (1) the difference bewere consistent with the null hypothesis. The 2
tween reality and the null hypothesis, and (2) the
situations should lead to different conclusions
sample size. Suppose, for example, that you are about
p., but the P-values associated with the
testing to see if the mean of a population (p.) is, tests are identical.
say, 100. The null hypothesis then is Ho: pL =
Taking another look at the 2 issues of The
100, versus the alternative hypothesis of Hi: p. 7#
of Wildlife Management, I noted a numJournal
100. One might use Student's t-test, which is
ber of articles that indicated a null hypothesis
was proven. Among these were (1) no difference
-00)
x V(nt
1),
in slope aspect of random snags (P = 0.112, n =
S
57), (2) no difference in viable seeds (F26 = 3.18,
where x is the mean of the sample, S is the P =
0.11), (3) lamb kill was not correlated to
standard deviation of the sample, and n is the
trapper hours (r12 = 0.50, P = 0.095), (4) no
sample size. Clearly, t can be made arbitrarily effect due to month (P = 0.07, n = 15), and (5)
large (and the P-value associated with it arbitrari- no significant differences in survival distributions
ly small) by making either (x - 100) or (P-values > 0.014!, n variable). I selected the exV(n-1) large enough. As the sample size in- amples to illustrate null hypotheses claimed to
creases, (x - 100) and S will approximately sta- be true, despite small sample sizes and P-values
bilize at the true parameter values. Hence, a that were small but (usually) >0.05. All examlarge value of n translates into a large value of ples, I believe, reflect the lack of power (Fig. 1A)
t. This strong dependence of P on the sample while claiming a lack of effect (Fig. 1B).
size led Good (1982) to suggest that P-values be
standardized to a sample size of 100, by replac- Power Analysis
Power analysis is an adjunct to hypothesis
ing P by P n/10 (or 0.5, if that is smaller).
Even more arbitrary in a sense than P is the testing that has become increasingly popular
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Table 1. Reactionof investigatorto resultsof a statisticalsignificancetest (afterNester 1996).

A

Statistical significance

Practical importance
of observed difference

Not important
Important
.

IX

~~~ ~ ~ ~

Not significant

Significant

Annoyed
Elated

Happy
Very sad
iii

0L

ho

H

LACKOF POWER

B

LACKOFEFFECT
Fig. 1. Resultsof a test thatfailedto rejectthe nullhypothesis
that a mean Lequals p,o.Shaded areas indicateregions for
whichhypothesiswouldbe rejected.(A) suggests the nullhypothesis may well be false, but the sample was too small to
indicatesignificance;there is a lackof power.(B) suggests the
data trulywere consistentwiththe nullhypothesis.

(Peterman 1990, Thomas and Krebs 1997). The
procedure can be used to estimate the sample
size needed to have a specified probability
(power = 1 - 13)of declaring as significant (at
the oa level) a particular difference or effect (effect size). As such, the process can usefully be
used to design a survey or experiment (Gerard
et al. 1998). Its use is sometimes recommended
to ascertain the power of the test after a study
has been conducted and nonsignificant results
obtained (The Wildlife Society 1995). The notion is to guard against wrongly declaring the
null hypothesis to be true. Such retrospective
power analysis can be misleading, however.
Steidl et al. (1997:274) noted that power estimated with the data used to test the null hypothesis and the observed effect size is meaningless, as a high P-value will invariably result
in low estimated power. Retrospective power
estimates may be meaningful if they are com-

puted with effect sizeS different from the observed effect size. Power analysis programs,
however,assume the input values for effect and
variance are known, rather than estimated, so
they give misleadinglyhigh estimates of power
(Steidl et al. 1997, Gerard et al. 1998). In addition, althoughstatisticalhypothesistesting invokes what I believe to be 1 rather arbitrary
parameter(oaor P), power analysisrequires3 of
them (a, 13,effect size). For further comments
see Shaver(1993:309),who termed power analysis "avacuousintellectualgame,"and who noted that the tendency to use criteria,such as Cohen's (1988) standardsfor small, medium, and
large effect sizes, is as mindless as the practice
of using the a = 0.05 criterionin statisticalsignificancetesting. Questionsabout the likely size
of true effects can be better addressed with
confidence intervals than with retrospective
power analyses (e.g., Steidl et al. 1997, Steiger
and Fouladi 1997).
Biological Versus Statistical Significance
Many authors make note of the distinction
between statisticalsignificanceand subject-matter (in our case, biological) significance.Unimportant differences or effects that do not attain
significanceare okay,and importantdifferences
that do show up significant are excellent, for
they facilitate publication (Table 1). Unimportant differences that turn out significantare annoying, and importantdifferences that fail statistical detection are truly depressing.Recalling
our earliercomments about the effect of sample
size on P-values,the 2 outcomes that please the
researcher suggest the sample size was about
right (Table 2). The annoyingunimportantdifTable2. Interpretation
of sample size as relatedto resultsof
a statisticalsignificancetest.
Practical importance
of observed difference

Not important
Important
_
_

Statistical significance
Not significant

n okay
n too small
m_

Significant

n too big
n okay

_
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ferences that were significant indicate that too
large a sample was obtained. Further, if an important difference was not significant, the investigator concludes that the sample was insufficient and calls for further research. This
schizophrenic nature of the interpretation of
significance greatly reduces its value.

OtherComments on HypothesisTests
Statistical hypothesis testing has received an
enormous amount of criticism, and for a rather
long time. In 1963, Clark (1963:466) noted that
it was "no longer a sound or fruitful basis for
statistical investigation." Bakan (1966:436)
called it "essential mindlessness in the conduct
of research." The famed quality guru W. Edwards Deming (1975) commented that the reason students have problems understanding hypothesis tests is that they may be trying to think.
Carver (1978) recommended that statistical significance testing should be eliminated; it is not
only useless, it is also harmful because it is interpreted to mean something else. Guttman
(1985) recognized that "In practice, of course,
tests of significance are not taken seriously."
Loftus (1991) found it difficult to imagine a less
insightful way to translate data into conclusions.
Cohen (1994:997) noted that statistical testing
of the null hypothesis "does not tell us what we
want to know, and we so much want to know
what we want to know that, out of desperation,
we nevertheless believe that it does!" Barnard
(1998:47) argued that ". . . simple P-values are
not now used by the best statisticians." These
examples are but a fraction of the comments
made by statisticians and users of statistics
about the role of statistical hypothesis testing.
While many of the arguments against significance tests stem from their misuse, rather than
their intrinsic values (Mulaik et al. 1997), I believe that 1 of their intrinsic problems is that
they do encourage misuse.

WHYARE HYPOTHESISTESTS USED?
With all the deficiencies of statistical hypothesis tests, it is reasonable to wonder why they
remain so widely used. Nester (1996) suggested
several reasons: (1) they appear to be objective
and exact; (2) they are readily available and easily invoked in many commercial statistics packages; (3) everyone else seems to use them; (4)
students, statisticians, and scientists are taught
to use them; and (5) some journal editors and
thesis supervisors demand them. Carver (1978)
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recognized that statistical significance is generally interpreted as having some relation to replication, which is the cornerstone of science.
More cynically, Carver (1978) suggested that
complicated mathematical procedures lend an
air of scientific objectivity to conclusions. Shaver (1993) noted that social scientists equate being quantitative with being scientific. D. V.
Lindley (quoted in Matthews 1997) observed
that "People like conventional hypothesis tests
because it's so easy to get significant results
from them."
I attribute the heavy use of statistical hypothesis testing, not just in the wildlife field but in
other "soft" sciences such as psychology, sociology, and education, to "physics envy." Physicists and other researchers in the "hard" sciences are widely respected for their ability to
learn things about the real world (and universe)
that are solid and incontrovertible, and also
yield results that translate into products that we
see daily. Psychologists, for 1 group, have difficulty developing tests that are able to distinguish 2 competing theories.
In the hard sciences, hypotheses are tested;
that process is an integral component of the hypothetico-deductive scientific method. Under
that method, a theory is postulated, which generates several predictions. These predictions are
treated as scientific hypotheses, and an experiment is conducted to try to falsify each hypothesis. If the results of the experiment refute the
hypothesis, that outcome implies that the theory
is incorrect and should be modified or scrapped.
If the results do not refute the hypothesis, the
theory stands and may gain support, depending
on how critical the experiment was.
In contrast, the hypotheses usually tested by
wildlife ecologists do not devolve from general
theories about how the real world operates.
More typically they are statistical hypotheses
(i.e., statements about properties of populations; Simberloff 1990). Unlike scientific hypotheses, the truth of which is truly in question,
most statistical hypotheses are known a priori to
be false. The confusion of the 2 types of hypotheses has been attributed to the pervasive
influence of R. A. Fisher, who did not distinguish them (Schmidt and Hunter 1997).
Scientific hypothesis testing dates back at
least to the 17th century: in 1620, Francis Bacon discussed the role of proposing alternative
explanations and conducting explicit tests to distinguish between them as the most direct route
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to scientific understanding (Quinn and Dunham
1983). This concept is related to Popperian inference, which seeks to develop and test hypotheses that can clearly be falsified (Popper
1959), because a falsified hypothesis provides
greater advance in understanding than does a
hypothesis that is supported. Also similar is
Platt's (1964) notion of strong inference, which
emphasizes developing alternative hypotheses
that lead to different predictions. In such a case,
results inconsistent with predictions from a hypothesis cast doubt of its validity.
Examples of scientific hypotheses, which
were considered credible, include Copernicus'
notion HA: the Earth revolves around the sun,
versus the conventional wisdom of the time, Ho:
the sun revolves around the Earth. Another example is Fermat's last theorem, which states
that for integers n, X, Y, and Z, Xn + yn = Zn
implies n - 2. Alternatively, a physicist may
make specific predictions about a parameter
based on a theory, and the theory is provisionally accepted only if the outcomes are within
measurement error of the predicted value, and
no other theories make predictions that also fall
within that range (Mulaik et al. 1997). Contrast
these hypotheses, which involve phenomena in
nature, with the statistical hypotheses presented
in The Journal of Wildlife Management, which
were mentioned above, and which involve properties of populations.
Rejection of a statistical hypothesis would constitute a piece of evidence to be considered in
deciding whether or not to reject a scientific hypothesis (Simberloff 1990). For example, a scientific hypothesis might state that clutch sizes of
birds increase with the age of the bird, up to
some plateau. That idea would generate a hypothesis that could be tested statistically within
a particular population of birds. A single such
test, regardless of its P-value, would little affect
the credibility of the scientific hypothesis, which
is far more general. A related distinction is that
scientific hypotheses are global, applying to all of
nature, while statistical hypotheses are local, applying to particular systems (Simberloff 1990).
Why do we wildlife ecologists rarely test scientific hypotheses? My view is that we are dealing with systems more complex than those faced
by physicists. A saying in ecology is that everything is connected to everything else. (In psychology, "everything correlates with everything,"
giving rise to what David Lykken called the
"crud factor" for such ambient correlation noise
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[Meehl 1997]). This saying implies that all variables in an ecological system are intercorrelated,
and that any null hypothesis postulating no effect
of a variable on another will in fact be false; a
statistical test of that hypothesis will be rejected,
as long as the sample is sufficiently large. This
line of reasoning does not denigrate the value of
experimentation in real systems; ecologists
should seek situations in which variables thought
to be influential can be manipulated and the results carefully monitored (Underwood 1997).
Too often, however, experimentation in natural
systems is very difficult if not impossible.
REPLICATION
Replication is a cornerstone of science. If results from a study cannot be reproduced, they
have no credibility. Scale is important here.
Conducting the same study at the same time
but at several different sites and getting comparable results is reassuring, but not nearly so
convincing as having different investigators
achieve similar results using different methods
in different areas at different times. R. A. Fisher's idea of solid knowledge was not a single
extremely significant result, but rather the ability of repeatedly getting results significant at 5%
(Tukey 1969). Shaver (1993:304) observed that
"The question of interest is whether an effect
size of a magnitude judged to be important has
been consistently obtained across valid replications. Whether any or all of the results are statistically significant is irrelevant." Replicated results automatically make statistical significance
testing unnecessary (Bauemfeind 1968).
Individual studies rarely contain sufficient information to support a final conclusion about the
truth or value of a hypothesis (Schmidt and
Hunter 1997). Studies differ in design, measurement devices, samples included, weather conditions, and many other ways. This variability
among studies is more pervasive in ecological situations than in, for example, the physical sciences (Ellison 1996). To have generality, results
should be consistent under a wide variety of circumstances. Meta-analysis provides some tools
for combining information from repeated studies
(e.g., Hedges and Olkin 1985) and can reduce
dependence on significance testing by examining
replicated studies (Schmidt and Hunter 1997).
Meta-analysis can be dangerously misleading,
however, if nonsignificant results or results that
did not conform to the conventional wisdom
were less likely to have been published.
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WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
What should we do instead of testing hypotheses? As Quinn and Dunham (1983) pointed
out, it is more fruitful to determine the relative
importance to the contributions of, and interactions between, a number of processes. For
this purpose, estimation is far more appropriate
than hypothesis testing (Campbell 1992). For
certain other situations, decision theory is an
appropriate tool. For either of these applications, as well as for hypothesis testing itself, the
Bayesian approach offers some distinct advantages over the traditional methods. These alternatives are briefly outlined below. Although the
alternatives will not meet all potential needs,
they do offer attractive choices in many frequently encountered situations.

Estimates and Confidence Intervals
Four decades ago, Anscombe (1956) observed that statistical hypothesis tests were totally irrelevant, and that what was needed were
estimates of magnitudes of effects, with standard errors. Yates (1964) indicated that "The
most commonly occurring weakness in the application of Fisherian methods is undue emphasis on tests of significance, and failure to
recognize that in many types of experimental
work estimates of the treatment effects, together with estimates of the errors to which they are
subject, are the quantities of primary interest."
Further, because wildlife ecologists want to influence management practices, Johnson (1995)
noted that, "If ecologists are to be taken seriously by decision makers, they must provide information useful for deciding on a course of action, as opposed to addressing purely academic
questions." To enforce that point, several education and psychological journals have adopted
editorial policies requiring that parameter estimates accompany any P-values be presented
(McLean and Ernest 1998).
Ordinary confidence intervals provide more
information than do P-values. Knowing that a
95% confidence interval includes zero tells one
that, if a test of the hypothesis that the parameter equals zero is conducted, the resulting Pvalue will be >0.05. A confidence interval provides both an estimate of the effect size and a
measure of its uncertainty. A 95% confidence
interval of, say, (-50, 300) suggests the parameter is less well estimated than would a confidence interval of (120, 130). Perhaps surpris-
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ingly, confidence intervals have a longer history
than statistical hypothesis tests (Schmidt and
Hunter 1997).
With its advantages and longer history, why
have confidence intervals not been used more
than they have? Steiger and Fouladi (1997) and
Reichardt and Gollob (1997) posited several explanations: (1) hypothesis testing has become a
tradition; (2) the advantages of confidence intervals are not recognized; (3) there is some ignorance of the procedures available; (4) major
statistical packages do not include many confidence interval estimates; (5) sizes of parameter
estimates are often disappointingly small, even
though they may be very significantly different
from zero; (6) the wide confidence intervals that
often result from a study are embarrassing; (7)
some hypothesis tests (e.g., chi-square contingency table) have no uniquely defined parameter associated with them; and (8) recommendations to use confidence intervals often are accompanied by recommendations to abandon
statistical tests altogether, which is unwelcome
advice. These reasons are not valid excuses for
avoiding confidence intervals in lieu of hypothesis tests in situations for which parameter estimation is the objective.

Decision Theory
Often experiments or surveys are conducted to
help make some decision, such as what limits to
set on hunting seasons, if a forest stand should be
logged, or if a pesticide should be approved. In
those cases, hypothesis testing is inadequate, for
it does not take into consideration the costs of
alternative actions. Here a useful tool is statistical
decision theory: the theory of acting rationally
with respect to anticipated gains and losses, in the
face of uncertainty. Hypothesis testing generally
limits the probability of a Type I error (rejecting
a true null hypothesis), often arbitrarilyset at a
= 0.05, while letting the probability of a Type II
error (accepting a false null hypothesis) fall where
it may. In ecological situations, however, a Type
II error may be far more costly than a Type I
error (Toft and Shea 1983). As an example, approving a pesticide that reduces the survival rate
of an endangered species by 5% may be disastrous to that species, even if that change is not
statistically detectable. As another, continued
overharvest in marine fisheries may result in the
collapse of the ecosystem even while statistical
tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis that
fishing has no effect (Dayton 1998). Details on
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decision theory can be found in DeGroot (1970),
Berger (1985), and Pratt et al. (1995).

Model Selection
Statistical tests can play a useful role in diagnostic checks and evaluations of tentative statistical models (Box 1980). But even for this application, competing tools are superior. Information criteria, such as Akaike's, provide objective measures for selecting among different
models fitted to a dataset. Burnham and Anderson (1998) provided a detailed overview of
model selection procedures based on information criteria. In addition, for many applications
it is not advisable to select a "best" model and
then proceed as if that model was correct.
There may be a group of models entertained,
and the data will provide different strength of
evidence for each model. Rather than basing
decisions or conclusions on the single model
most strongly supported by the data, one should
acknowledge the uncertainty about the model
by considering the entire set of models, each
perhaps weighted by its own strength of evidence (Buckland et al. 1997).

Bayesian Approaches
Bayesian approaches offer some alternatives
preferable to the ordinary (often called frequentist, because they invoke the idea of the
long-term frequency of outcomes in imagined
repeats of experiments or samples) methods for
hypothesis testing, as well as for estimation and
decision-making. Space limitations preclude a
detailed review of the approach here; see Box
and Tiao (1973), Berger (1985), and Carlin and
Louis (1996) for longer expositions, and Schmitt
(1969) for an elementary introduction.
Sometimes the value of a parameter is predicted from theory, and it is more reasonable to
test whether or not that value is consistent with
the observed data than to calculate a confidence
interval (Berger and Delampady 1987, Zellner
1987). For testing such hypotheses, what is usually desired (and what is sometimes believed to
be provided by a statistical hypothesis test) is
Pr[Ho I data]. What is obtained, as pointed out
earlier, is P = Pr[observed or more extreme
data I Ho]. Bayes' theorem offers a formula for
converting between them.
Pr[H0 data] = Pr[data H]Pr[H0]
This is an old (Bayes 1763) and well-known the-
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orem in probability. Its use in the present situation does not follow from the frequentist view
of statistics, which considers Pr[Ho] as unknown, but either zero or 1. In the Bayesian
approach, Pr[H0] is determined before data are
gathered; it is therefore called the prior probability of H0. Pr[H0] can be determined either
subjectively (what is your prior belief about the
truth of the null hypothesis?) or by a variety of
objective means (e.g., Box and Tiao 1973, Carlin and Louis 1996). The use of subjective probabilities is a major reason that Bayesian approaches fell out of favor: science must be objective! (The other main reason is that Bayesian
calculations tend to get fairly heavy, but modern
computer capabilities can largely overcome this
obstacle.)
Briefly consider parameter estimation. Suppose you want to estimate a parameter 0. Then
replacing Ho by 0 in the above formula yields
P [0d

t

]-

Pr[data IO]Pr[0],
Pr[data]

which provides an expression that shows how
initial knowledge about the value of a parameter, reflected in the prior probability function
Pr[0], is modified by data obtained from a study,
Pr[data I 0], to yield a final probability function,
Pr[0 I data]. This process of updating beliefs
leads in a natural way to adaptive resource management (Holling 1978, Walters 1986), a recent
favorite topic in wildlife science (e.g., Walters
and Green 1997).
Bayesian confidence intervals are much more
natural than their frequentist counterparts. A frequentist 95% confidence interval for a parameter
0, denoted (0L, 0U), is interpreted as follows: if
the study were repeated an infinite number of
times, 95% of the confidence intervals that resulted would contain the true value 0. It says
nothing about the particular study that was actually conducted, which led Howson and Urbach
(1991:373) to comment that "statisticians regularly say that one can be '95 per cent confident'
that the parameter lies in the confidence interval.
They never say why." In contrast, a Bayesian confidence interval, sometimes called a credible interval, is interpreted to mean that the probability
that the true value of the parameter lies in the
interval is 95%. That statement is much more
natural, and is what people think a confidence
interval is, until they get the notion drummed
out of their heads in statistics courses.
For decision analysis, Bayes' theorem offers
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a very logical way to make decisions in the face
of uncertainty. It allows for incorporating beliefs, data, and the gains or losses expected from
possible consequences of decisions. See Wolfson et al. (1996) and Ellison (1996) for recent
overviews of Bayesian methods with an ecological orientation.

CONCLUSIONS
Editors of scientific journals, along with the
referees they rely on, are really the arbiters of
scientific practice. They need to understand
how statistical methods can be used to reach
sound conclusions from data that have been
gathered. It is not sufficient to insist that authors use statistical methods-the
methods
must be appropriate to the application. The
most common and flagrant misuse of statistics,
in my view, is the testing of hypotheses, especially the vast majority of them known beforehand to be false.
With the hundreds of articles already published that decry the use of statistical hypothesis
testing, I was somewhat hesitant about writing
another. It contains nothing new. But still, reading The Journal of Wildlife Management makes
me realize that the message has not really
reached the audience of wildlife biologists. Our
work is important, so we should use the best
tools we have available. Rarely, however, is that
tool statistical hypothesis testing.
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